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NOTE
PLEA BARGAINING: THE CASE FOR REFORM
Although plea bargaining has not been openly recognized or sanctioned
by most courts,1 it has become quite widespread and effective.2 Due to this
lack of formal recognition, no uniform plea bargaining procedure has been
developed, but generally, an accused is encouraged to plead guilty in ex-
change for some concession, the most familiar being a promise by the prose-
cutor to ask the court for leniency. Such concession is far from being the
only "reward" offered by the state;3 indeed, if it were the only one, the
practice would not have flourished as it has. Depending upon the particular
laws of the forum, the prosecutor may agree to a guilty plea to some lesser
included offense; dismiss the remaining charges for a plea of guilty to one
1 Until recently the constitutional validity of plea bargaining was in question. See
Shupe v. Sigler, 230 F. Supp. 601, 606 (D. Neb. 1964) (alternative holding) (guilty plea
which is the product of plea bargaining is involuntary per se). But see, e.g., United
States v. Williams, 407 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1969); Martin v. United States, 256 F.2d 345
(5th Cir. 1958); People v. Guiden, 172 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1958); Commonwealth v. Maroney,
423 Pa. 337, 223 A.2d 699 (1966) (plea not involuntary merely because it is produced
by plea negotiations).
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) settled these doubts, upholding the
validity of the bargained guilty plea. See note 55 infra and accompanying text.
Only following this decision have courts felt compelled to confirm the legality of
plea bargaining and thereby to set up procedures "in the strong light of full disclosure."
People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 596, 477 P.2d 409, 410, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 386 (1970).
See also Clancy v. Coiner, - W. Va. - , 179 S.E2d 726 (1971).
2 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.10 (1970): "It has been estimated
that about 90%, and perhaps 95%, of all criminal convictions are by pleas of guilty;
between 70% and 85% of all felony convictions are estimated to be by guilty plea:'
Since plea bargaining has only recently been recognized, there is little evidence to
show exactly what proportion of guilty pleas are the result of the practice. It is thought
that the number is great. The University of Pennsylvania Law Review surveyed prose-
cutors' offices in 43 states and the percentage of negotiated pleas ranged from less than
10 per cent to more than 70 per cent. See Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises
by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. RFv. 865, 896-99 (1964).
Courts have recognized the role that plea bargaining plays in securing guilty pleas.
See Barber v. Gladden, 220 F. Supp. 308 (D. Ore. 1963) (has become integral part of
the administration of justice); People v. Williams, 75 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1969)
(essential to smooth and fair administration of justice); In re Hawley, 67 Cal. 2d 824,
433 P.2d 919, 63 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1967) (a substantial portion and maybe even a vast
majority of guilty pleas are the result of plea bargaining).
3 See D. NEWmAN, CoNvi roN: THE DETERMNATON OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT
TmiAr 78-90 (1966); Guilty Plea Note, supra note 2.
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of multiple courts;4 promise not to press charges against a friend or accom-
plice;5 or agree not to charge the accused under any applicable habitual of-
fender law.6 In some localities the bargaining is not limited to the prosecu-
tor, permitting the judge also to participate. 7
The benefits of a plea bargaining practice for the state are readily ap-
parent. With defendants pleading guilty, the overall cost of their criminal
prosecution is reduced, administrative efficiency in the courts is greatly in-
creased, and the crowded court dockets are eased, thus allowing more at-
tention to cases in which there is a substantial question of guilt., Plea bar-
gaining also allows the prosecutor to individualize punishment with an eye
toward rehabilitating a defendant-a goal otherwise made more difficult be-
cause of the high minimum sentences often set by outmoded criminal statutes.
A guilty plea also has certain distinct advantages for a truly guilty de-
fendant. For a person ready to admit his guilt, a protracted wait for trial
in an overcrowded jail may be avoided, 9 as well as the uncertainty as to his
punishment. The accused will also be spared the notoriety which accom-
panies a lengthy trial,10 and in many cases he may escape some socially of-
fensive label commonly associated with sex crimes.:" The most direct benefit
to a guilty defendant would be the possibility of a reduced sentence.
4 See United States v. Weber, 429 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1970) (agreement to plead guilty
to one of two counts if the more severe is dropped); Smith v. People, 162 Colo. 558,
428 P.2d 69 (1967) (common practice for commonwealth attorney to dismiss or fail
to file additional charges).
5 See Johnson v. Wilson, 371 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1967) (pregnant wife not to be
charged with narcotics offense); Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795 (lst Cir. 1959>
(avoid fiancee being tried as accomplice).
GSee Ford v. United States, 418 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1969) (charge under state habitual
criminal law would be dropped, if defendant would plead guilty to the federal charges).
7See Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1970) (participation by a Virginia
state judge in plea discussions does not render the plea per se involuntary but is
merely one factor to be considered). But see Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52,
252 A.2d 689 (1969). See generally notes 94-97 infra.
8See Lassiter v. Turner, 423 F.2d 897 (4th Cir. 1970) (plea bargaining increases the
quality of justice in those cases which must be tried); Raleigh v. Coiner, 302 F. Supp.
1151, 1160 (N.D. W. Va. 1969) (plea bargaining leads to accomplishment of justice at
minimum cost and with maximum efficiency).
9 See Langdeau v. South Dakota, 446 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1971) (defendant pleaded
guilty because the county jail where he was confined was crowded and he did not like
the food).
10 See Overman v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 237 (W.D. Tenn. 1969) (plea allows
guilty defendant to spare himself and his family the spectacle and expense of protracted
trial proceedings).
11 See State v. Ashby, 81 N.J. Super. 350, 195 A.2d 635 (1963) (defendant allowed
to plead guilty to charge of disorderly person instead of open lewdness).
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I. OBJECTIONS RAISED TO PLEA BARGAINING
Even in light of the enumerated benefits to both parties involved, plea bar-
gaining has been criticized inasmuch as the desired result-a plea of guilty-
has some rather severe consequences for the accused. If his plea is accepted
'by the court, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all the elements of
'the crime necessary for a conviction. The only step remaining is the imposi-
tion of the sentence.' 2 By so pleading, the defendant's constitutional rights
to a trial by jury, to a confrontation with his accusers, and against self-in-
crimination have been waived.13 Additionally, no objections may be made
to any errors committed prior to arraignment unless they assume jurisdic-
tional proportions.14
The safeguards applicable to the waiver of other constitutionally protected
rights have been applicable to plea bargaining-that is, in order to be bind-
ing on the defendant, his plea must be entered voluntarily and with knowl-
edge of the consequences of his act.'5 However, it is generally agreed that
plea bargaining, due to its secretive nature, should not continue as presently
practiced, i.e., widespread, yet officially unrecognized. It is not surprising
that there is disagreement as to what action should be taken. Some would
12Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927), cited with approval in Boy-
'kin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
U3See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (guilty plea amounts to a
-waiver of these fundamental rights); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right
'to jury trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront accusers);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (right against self-incrimination).
14See, e.g., Nobles v: Beto, 439 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1971) (plea waives denial of
defendant's right to-compulsory process, his right to counsel at police interrogation, and
his right to be brought immediately before a magistrate); Colson v. Smith, 438 F.2d
1075 (5th Cir. 1971) (objections as to construction of grand jury waived); Lavergne v.
Henderson, 323 F. Supp. 532 (W.D. La. 1971) (cannot consider question of a coerced
'confession on appeal-coerced confession does not necessarily mean that the plea was
coerced); Loomis v. Peyton, 323 F. Supp. 246 (W.D. Va. 1971) (defendant may no
longer object to any illegal search or seizure).
But see Gilinsky v. United States, 430 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1970) (plea does not waive
'objections concerning the inducements to plead); United States ex rel. Stephen v. Shelly,
430 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1970) (under New York law a plea does not waive all non-juris-
dictional defects); Colson v. Smith, 315 F. Supp. 179 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (plea does not
-waive any defects which are clearly jurisdictional); United States v. Kelly, 314 F.
Supp. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (no waiver if alleged defect is the prosecution itself).
1 15 According to the classic definition, a valid waiver of constitutional rights is "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege' Johnson
Iv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See Boykin v.,Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)
(states must abide by federal standards); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220
1927) (federal courts will not accept unless voluntary and knowledgeable).
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abolish plea bargaining altogether,16 while others feel that the proper ap-
proach would be to institute much needed reforms.' 7
Those who wish to abolish plea bargaining base their attack on argu-
ments of questionable validity. They fear the official recognition of plea bar-
gaining might bring about a shift toward the administrative determination
of guilt,' resulting in a great detriment to the public, the encouragement
of illicit government practices, and necessarily, the loss of protection for
the rights of the individual.
A. Public Detriment
It is true that the public benefits in a general way from jury trials. A trial
is instructional by providing the populace a "lesson in legal procedure, dig-
nity, fairness and justice." 19 It gives people a greater degree of social re-
sponsibility by virtue of their participation as jurors.20 These lessons are
perpetuated by a steady flow of trials, which will not abate even with the
increased acceptance of plea bargaining.
It is also argued that jury trials enhance the legitimacy of criminal justice
by making the guilt determination a matter open and before the public, and
that secretive plea bargaining might lessen the public's confidence in the
criminal justice system.21 But, behind the scenes discussions are not in-
herent in plea bargaining. They have only come about because the courts
have chosen not to recognize the practice. Any such "defect" is easily cured.
16 See generally Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REv.
1387 (1970); Note, Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of
Sentence, 66 YALE LJ. 204 (1956).
17See generally Bongiovanni, Guilty Plea Negotiation, 7 DuQ. L. REv. 542 (1969);
Underwood, Let's Put Plea Discussions-and Agreements-on Record, 1 LOYOLA (Cm.)
L.J. 1 (1970); White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U.
PA. L. REv. 439 (1971); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors
to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964); AMERICAN BAR AsS'N PRoJEcr oN
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATNG 'TO PLEAS OF GUILTY
(Tent. Draft 1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
18 There would actually be little or no shift to an administrative determination since
the practice is presently widespread. See note 2 supra. Although there may be some
slight increase in plea bargaining, official recognition primarily would bring the present
practice into a position in which it could be effectively controlled. See note 45 infra
and accompanying text.
19 Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third "Model" of the Crimal
Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 398 (1970).
20 See Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1387,
1395-96 (1970). '
21 Not only is the confidence of the public lost by the present system, but by being
secretive it also reduces the rehabilitative effectiveness. See Newman, Pleading Guilty
for Considerations: A Study of Bargain justice, 46 J. CRIm L.C. & Ps. 780 (1956).
[Vol. 6:325
PLEA BARGAINING
B. Illicit Government Practices
Since a plea of guilty is a waiver of all non-jurisdictional errors, the
thought has been advanced that the recognition of plea bargaining, and the
consequential increase in guilty pleas, will tend to encourage the govern-
ment to make illegal searches and use illegal means to force confessions.22
In theory, the main reason police abstain from such conduct is that any
evidence, and the fruits therefrom, would be excluded from use in a sub-
sequent trial.23 Conceivably the police could coerce a confession and use it
to encourage a defendant to plead guilty, and once he so pleads, their past
illegal conduct would be absolved.24 Again the problem is not one which is
unavoidable with a bargaining practice, but which may be prevented with
proper police restrictions.2 5
C. Loss of Individual Rights
The most persuasive criticism of plea bargaining concerns the anticipated
loss of protection for the rights of an accused. It has been contended by
some that there can be no viable substitute for a trial determination of guilt
which would insure protection of individual rights. But this view unjusti-
fiably presupposes the infallibility of the jury trial.26 Many factors other
than a search for the truth affect the guilt determination process.27 More-
22 See 83 HARv. L. REv., supra note 20, at 1396.
23 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (coerced confession); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (illegal search).
24 As a consequence of pleading guilty, the defendant waives his objections to illegally
seized evidence and any coercion employed to elicit a confession. See, e.g., Brown v.
Beto, 377 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1967) (illegal confession in prosecutor's possession cannot
be basis for collateral attack on a valid plea); Loomis v. Peyton, 323 F. Supp. 246 (WD.
Va. 1971) (illegally seized evidence).
The police are deterred in blatant cases. The issue of the validity of a confession or
admissibility of seized evidence must be examined by the court if the defendant alleges
that his guilty plea was a product of the abridgment of his corresponding constitutional
rights. Assuming the truth of the allegation, the plea itself would have been involuntary.
See Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); Gladden v. Holland,
366 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1966) (guilty plea given a few hours after a coerced confession
invalid). '
25 Our legal system has not developed to the point of invalidating a particular practice
simply because it is potentially coercive if abused. The Supreme Court has recognized
that unregulated police interrogations were highly coercive. The solution was not to
prohibit the policy of questioning, but to establish safeguards which would lessen the
impact on the defendant. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26 J. FRANK, CoURrs ON TRIAL, MyrH AND RFALITy IN AMEmCAN JusTicE 124 (1949):
Mr. Justice Cordoza, in a Supreme Court opinion, wrote, "Few would be so
narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and enlightened system of justice
would be impossible without" jury trials.
27 See PRsmaNT'S CoznMissioN oN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
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over, most court decisions fail to properly consider the implications of mod-
em developments in sociology, psychology, and psychiatry.28
1. Chilling Effect Arguments
One further argument against plea bargaining involving the rights of the
accused is founded in the pervasive chilling effect concept, which was de-
veloped to give "breathing space" 29 to certain constitutionally protected
rights. 30 The substance of this new concept, as it applies to plea bargain-
ing, broadens the critical standard by which the validity of governmental
action is judged. To be objectionable, a particular practice does not have
to actually coerce a defendant, thereby rendering his subsequent choice
necessarily involuntary. The courts now recognize that a government may
so structure a set of circumstances that an individual would be hard pressed
to assert his rights, since to do so would be "costly." 31 Such a conclusion was
reached in United States v. Jackson,82 in which the court noted that "[t] he
evil . . . is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but
simply that it needlessly encourages them." 83 Without some justification,
any encouragement to waive guaranteed rights directed toward the defend-
ant would be invalid even though the pressure would not remove the ele-
ment of voluntariness from the defendant's choice. To ascertain what is
"needless encouragement" within the Jackson rationale, a court must under-
take a balancing process, weighing the particular individual right present
and the degree to which it is deterred, against the necessity of this practice
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CouRis 10 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FoRCE REPoRT]:
At its best the trial process is an imperfect method of factfinding; factors such
as the attorney's skill, the availability of witnesses, the judge's attitude, jury
vagaries, and luck will influence the result.
See generally, Newman, Trial by Jury: An Outmoded Relic? 46 J. CruM. L.C. & P.S.
512 (1955).
281d. at 518.
29 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963).
so Although the chilling effect doctrine developed in the area of first amendment
rights, see Malone v. Emmet, 278 F. Supp. 193, 200-01 (MD. Ala. 1967) (chilling effect
only applies to first amendment cases), it has expanded into the criminal law as well.
See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (no unjustifiably higher sentence
on retrial after appeal); Griffin v. California, 380 US. 609 (1965) (improper for
prosecutor to comment on the defendant's failure to take the witness stand); Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (successful appeal does not waive former jeopardy
plea).
As applicable to plea bargaining, the chilling effect rationale has been used in the
area of waiver of jury trials. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
31 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
32 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
33 Id. at 583.
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to advance some valid public interest 4 If there is no public interest ad-
vanced, or if the same result could be reached by some "less drastic means,"
then the conduct is unjustifiable and invalid.
Two chilling effect arguments may be made as a result of the circum-
stances surrounding plea bargaining.36 The first involves the validity of gov-
ernment action in offering benefits to an accused, thus making his choice of
pleas a difficult one. The second argument attacks not the offer, but ques-
tions the propriety of a sentencing differential-that is, the imposition of a
punishment which is more severe after a trial than it would have been had
the defendant pleaded guilty.
Since plea bargaining involves an offer of some benefit to an accused in
exchange for his guilty plea, there is little question that he must pay a price
in order to exercise his right to a jury trial. The inquiry now should be
first to determine if any public interest is served by such payment, and if
so, whether there is any less drastic way to achieve the same result.
The public has a definite interest in plea bargaining since the procedure
is designed to increase the efficiency of the administration of criminal jus-
tice.37 The goal of a more efficient system might seem a questionable pur-
pose for which to subordinate the right to trial, but this goal must be as-
sessed within the precarious framework of the entire judicial process. 38 If
all the cases which might be settled by guilty pleas were forced upon the
courts, the already overcrowded system might very well collapse under the
strain. The public interest in "negotiated" justice then is not in mere effi-
ciency, but rather the paramount interest in a functional judicial system,
which is the basic protection for individuals in an ordered society.
39
34 See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967):
The validity of a consequence depends both upon the hazards, if any, it
presents to the integrity of the privilege and upon the urgency of the public
interests it is designed to protect.
Id. at 507 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
36 See generally Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARv. L. REv.
1387 (1970).
37 See, e.g., State v. Wright, 103 Ariz. 52, 436 P.2d 601 (1968) (there is a public
interest in encouraging guilty pleas); People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 413, 91
Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970) (benefit to the state is that it lessens cost and increases efficiency).
38 "Interminable delays in civil cases; unconscionable delays in criminal cases; . . .
a steadily growing backlog of work that threatens to make the delays worse tomorrow
than they are today . . . ." Address by President Nixon, National Conference on the
Judiciary, in Williamsburg, Virginia, Mar. 11, 1971.
39See Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, National Conference on the
Judiciary, in Williamsburg, Virginia, Mar. 12, 1071:
[T]he administration of justice is the "adhesive--the very glue-that keeps the
parts of an organized society from flying apart. Man can tolerate many short-
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There has not been offered a less drastic alternative that would allow a
defendant a completely free choice for trial, short of a mandatory trial in
every case, which must be avoided for obvious practical reasons.40 Aside
from the argument that a defendant has a constitutional right to plead
guilty,41 a lack of resources prevents the expansion of the judicial machinery
which would be required to effectively handle the increased load.4 2 It is
also thought that by trying a great number of cases in which no substantial
issue of guilt was present, the presumption of innocence would be weakened
and the courts would become skeptical of a real defense when presented.
4 3
It is not a realistic alternative to forbid plea bargaining and at the same
time continue to accept guilty pleas. 44 This was the situation in past years,
and experience has shown that prosecutors still offered "deals." The real
danger from plea bargaining lies in the fact that since the practice is offi-
comings of his existence, but history teaches us that great societies have foundered
for want of an adequate system of justice.
See also III R. PouND, JuRIsPRUDENcE 277-82 (1959).
40 Such an alternative has been suggested. It was suggested that if there was a trial in
every case, the fairness in each case might decrease but there would be an increase in the
overall fairness. Even accepting this to be a valid observation, the change proposed was
based on a necessary reformation of society's philosophy. The adversary system would
be abandoned in favor of a "family" system. This shift of philosophy seems highly
unlikely. See Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third "Model" of the
Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970).
41 See Lawrence v. State, 455 S.W.2d 650 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970). "The right to
plead not guilty has inherently and constitutionally within it the right to plead guilty."
Id. at 651. See also People v. White, 8 Mich. App. 220, 154 N.W.2d 1 (1967); Day
v. Page, 436 P.2d 59 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968).
But see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962) (defendant has no absolute
right to have guilty plea accepted under federal rules); Griffin v. United States, 405
F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (a guilty plea should not be refused without good reason);
State v. Fernald, 248 A.2d 754 (Me. 1968).
42See President Nixon's Address, supra note 38:
[Ihf we limit ourselves to calling for more judges, more police, more lawyers
operating in the same system, we will produce more backlogs, more delays, more
litigation, more jails and more criminals. "More of the same" is not the answer.
4' Cf. Lassiter v. Turner, 423 F.2d 897 (4th Cir. 1970) (plea bargaining increases the
quality of justice in those cases which must be tried).
44 Once an agreement has been reached which is thought to be beneficial by both
parties, neither the prosecutor nor the defendant will subsequently say or do anything
which might cause them to lose the benefit gained. Presently a federal judge is required
to canvass the defendant to determine if his plea is valid. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238 (1969); FED. R. CrM. P. 11. As a general rule the judge will ask the defendant
if anyone has made any promises to him and the reply is a categorical "No." See United
States v. Jackson, 390 F.2d 130, 138 (7th Cir. 1968) (Kiley, J., dissenting). If plea bar-
gaining were clearly outlawed, there is even more reason to suspect a similar charade
to be practiced since a defendant would know that his plea would automatically be
rejected.
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dally nonexistent,45 the prosecutor is free to employ whatever coercive
pressures he desires, as there is no one to police his actions. This alternative,
then, would do a graver injustice to the rights of the accused than an open
recognition of the practice, since effective controls can only be imposed if
the practice is officially before the public.
The prevalence of sentence differentials is also the foundation for a "chill-
ing effect" argument against plea bargaining. In North Carolina v. Pearce,.4
the Court held that a state may not impose a higher sentence after a success-
ful appeal and retrial merely to discourage appeals.41 Similarly, a state may
not impose a higher sentence solely because the accused demands a trial. It
is important to note that the Supreme Court did not place an absolute bar
upon a higher sentence upon retrial.48 A judge may validly impose a more
severe sentence in light of any new facts which would inform the court
of the "life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities" 49
of the defendant.
There are valid justifications for the disparity between sentences after
guilty pleas and those following trial determinations of guilt. The courts
will argue that the individual who pleads guilty shows that he is moving
toward rehabilitation, 0 therefore the lighter sentence is a reward for the
guilty plea, as opposed to the stiffer penalty being a punishment. This is
merely begging the issue, since the accused knows he may be benefited by
the formality of the plea whether he is repentant or not. The better response
is that during a trial the defendant may have committed perjury, asserted
a frivolous defense, or at the very least revealed circumstances of the crime
and himself,51 any of which reasons would justify a higher sentence by the
test in Pearce.
45 See, e.g., People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 417, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970)
(danger of secretiveness results from lack of judicial sanction).
46 395 US. 711 (1969).
47 Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for
having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence
he receives after a new trial.
Id. at 725.
4 It was argued that the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy (U.S. CoNsr.
amend. V) and the Equal Protection Clause (U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1) absolutely
forbade the imposition of a more severe sentence upon retrial, but these contentions
were rejected. 395 U.S. at 723.
49 ld.
5OSee ABA STAimuAws § 1.8(a) (ii).
51 See generally Note, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determina-
tion of Sentence, 66 YAt LJ. 204, 209-19 (1956) (although the conditions are criticized,
the justifications have been made and are used).
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2. Equal Protection Argument
Another line of attack on plea bargaining is founded on the loss of the
rights, not of the defendants who plead guilty, but of those individuals who
maintain their innocence and go to trial. It could be argued that they have
been denied equal protection of the law, since generally speaking the sen-
tence which is imposed at the conclusion of the trial is higher than that
which would have been received upon a plea of guilty. Upon a close exami-
nation of the equal protection rationale it becomes apparent that the govern-
ment has not "invidiously classified" these defendants.52 By choosing to ac-
cept a jury trial, these defendants had the opportunity to be acquitted or
to receive a lesser sentence, but at the same time they subjected themselves
to the possibility of receiving a harsher sentence. It is a specious argument
that the higher punishment was the direct result of demanding a trial since
"the result may depend upon a particular combination of infinite variables
peculiar to each individual trial." 53
Although the Supreme Court has never directly dealt with any particular
bargaining practice, it is difficult to foresee the Court invalidating any rea-
sonable bargaining procedure in light of dictum in Brady v. United States: 5
... [W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend
a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the
State and who demonstrates by his [guilty] plea that he is ready and
willing to admit his crime .... .5
II. REFORMATION OF PLEA BARGAINING PRACTICE
That plea bargaining exerts pressures upon a defendant cannot be denied,
and idealistically any waiver of a fundamental right should be the product
of a mind free of all external influences and pressures. 6 However, accept-
ing as a fact the limitations inherent in our legal system, such completely
52 See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 722-23 (1969).
53 Id. at 722.
54 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
55 I. at 753.
56 As long as the defendant has the option to plead guilty, the pressure on him to so
plead will be inherent in the system. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 161 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (no truly voluntary confessions as the system is frought with
pressures). See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970):
The State to some degree encourages pleas of guilty at every important step in
the criminal process. For some people, . . . apprehension and charge, both
threatening acts by the Government, jar them into admitting their guilt. In still
other cases, the post-indictment accumulation of evidence may convince the de-
fendant . . . that a trial is not worth the agony .... All these pleas of guilty
are valid in spite of the State's responsibility for some of the factors motivating
the pleas ....
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untrammeled conditions are unrealistic. The need for plea bargaining is in-
escapable and all efforts should be directed not toward its eliminationP7 but
to whatever reforms are necessary to provide the maximum individual pro-
tection within the framework of a practically feasible system.
The procedure set out below does not pretend to be a solution to all the
problems surrounding plea bargaining. It is offered more to point up some
of the areas of difficulty and to show that many of the objections can be
minimized. The suggested safeguards do not reflect the minimum standards
presently demanded by the courts' requirements for voluntary and know-
ing waiver. They offer more protection to the defendant in an attempt to
greatly reduce the coercive influences to which he is presently subjected.
The desired goal is a system in which an innocent defendant will not feel
compelled to plead guilty;58 and a truly guilty individual may make his
choice in a rational manner based on the facts of his situation. 9
This goal is of the utmost importance in light of the view the Supreme
Court seems to have taken as to the finality of guilty pleas once accepted.
It is felt that the Court is moving "toward the goal of insulating all guilty
pleas from subsequent attack no matter what unconstitutional action of gov-
ernment may have induced a particular plea." '0 Consequently, any plea
bargaining procedure must afford protection to the individuals prior to final
acceptance of his plea.01
57 Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1964):
The important thing is not that there shall be no "deal" or "bargain," but that
the plea shall be a genuine one, by a defendant who is guilty; one who under-
stands his situation, his rights, and the consequences of the plea, and is neither
deceived nor coerced.
58See Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155, 158 n.7 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
847 (1968) (plea bargaining that induces an innocent person to plead guilty cannot
be sanctioned); Davidson v. State, 92 Idaho 104, 437 P.2d 620, 621 (1968) (plea is in-
voluntary if made under such inducements as would cause an innocent person to con-
fess guilt).
59 Some innocent defendants plead guilty when such action is the more attractive of
the two alternatives open to him. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 822, at 246 (3d ed.
1940). A fine line must be drawn so that the necessary guilty pleas will be forthcoming
but at the same time only guilty individuals will be persuaded to so plead. See generally
Comment, Official Inducements to Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals for a Marketplace,
32 U. Cm. L. REv. 167 (1964).
6o McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 775 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61 A motion to withdraw a guilty plea may usually only be made before the sentence
is imposed. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d). After a plea has become final, a defendant
can attack it collaterally only on the basis of lack of effective counsel or involuntariness
of the plea. See United States v. Smith, 448 F.2d 726 (4th Cir. 1971). On this attack
there is a presumption in favor of the plea's validity that the defendant must overcome.
See Vanater v. Boles, 377 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1967) (defendant must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence facts rendering the plea involuntary); Commonwealth v.
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [ l
A. Prenegotiation Considerations
As has been suggested, the first step in the development of safeguards is
an official sanction for plea bargaining, and the establishment of some formal
procedure to be uniformly followed. 2 The adoption of standardized guide-
lines would not only afford a means to regulate plea negotiations, but would
also tend to negate the equal protection objection to the practice. It is not
imperative that all defendants be offered the same concessions, 63 so long as
all individuals have the same opportunity to bargain. This does not mean
that all defendants must be allowed to negotiate, but only that the prosecu-
tor's decision whether to bargain or not be based on the same rational con-
siderations.64
Any formal procedure must be public in nature in order to give it the
legitimacy necessary to gain the support of the people.6 5 With such open-
ness, some of the coerciveness presently inherent in plea bargaining would
likely be reduced. Any thought by the defendant that the procedure is in-
quisitorial, which is presently generated by the negotiations being held be-
hind closed doors, will automatically be dispelled.66
Holl, 434 Pa. 312, 254 A.2d 11 (1969) (presumed plea was made knowingly); Common-
wealth v. Simpson, 434 Pa. 439, 254 A.2d 306 (1969) (burden of proving illegal induce-
ment on defendant); Gibson v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 810, 177 N.W.2d 912 (1970) (defendant
must prove plea's invalidity by clear and convincing evidence).
6 2 See United States v. Williams, 407 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1969); Smith v. United States,
277 F. Supp. 850 (D. Md. 1967); Commonwealth v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 223 A.2d
699 (1966); State ex rel. Clancy v. Coiner, - W. Va. - , 179 S.E.2d 726 (1971).
* . .We should exhume the process from stale obscurantism and let the fresh light
of open analysis expose both the prior discussions and agreements of the parties,
as well as the court's reasons for its resolution of the matter.
People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 417, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970).
There have been many standardized practices suggested. See ABA STANDARDS; TASK
FORc E REPORT 12-13; Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to
Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964).
63 Cf. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (state not required to impose
same punishment on different individuals for same crime; it may adopt the modern
philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not the crime).
64 The American Bar Association suggests that the prosecutor only bargain "when it
appears that the interest of the public in effective administration of criminal justice ...
would thereby be served"' ABA STANDARDS § 3.1(a). To aid in the determination of
what is "in the public interest," six factors have been listed for consideration in each
case. ABA STANDARDS § 1.8(a) (i)-(vi).
65 See Raleigh v. Coiner, 302 F. Supp. 1151, 1160-61 (N.D. W. Va. 1969):
The agreement reached here was made part of the public record and the negotia-
tions were carried out in the ventilated atmosphere of openhandedness and truth-
fulness, replete with good faith and fairness, with no underlying covert or extra-
judicial factors.66 See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961). It is not the lack of truth
which invalidates involuntary pleas but they are unacceptable "because the methods
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Of equal importance is the change that this recognition would cause in
the mind of the defendant. He would be forced to realize that he is not
just "getting off easy," but that only those consequences which are in the
interest of the public are being afforded. In this way some of the present
contempt for criminal justice could be eliminated.67
Another consequence of a public bargaining procedure would be to force
the prosecutor to investigate more fully and to develop substantial evidence
in the case. Absent ample incriminating proof, a defendant will not plead
guilty without some substantial benefit being conceded to him. However,
bargaining publically, the prosecutor will be unable to offer a man charged
with a serious crime some minimal punishment because such a compromise
would incense the public's notion of justice.68 People would not accept a
practice of offering large concessions merely to coerce guilty pleas. This
aspect of increasing the quantum of evidence collected in each case limits
two serious problems. The chance of arbitrary prosecutions will be greatly
reduced since a dearth of evidence is inherent in such actions. Also, the
prosecutor will not be as tempted to bring charges greatly in excess of those
that he knows he can prove merely to improve his bargaining position.
Responsibility for initiating plea negotiations should be shifted from the
,defendant to the prosecutor. This change would be consistent with the dis-
,cretion presently vested in the prosecutor, as to whether to prosecute or not
and if so on what charge.69 Such an alteration is needed to correct a grave
used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal
law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system...."
67 See Thompson, The Judge's Responsibility on a Plea of Guilty, 62 W. VA. L.
REv. 213 (1960). Prisoners' contempt for the judicial system was exemplified by state-
ments in petitions to the West Virginia Legislature to the effect that courts used "every
shabby trick" in order to "expedite and clear their docket."
Additionally, much contempt is generated by the present system when an unexperienced
defendant, who accepted a trial, gets to prison and discovers that he is to serve a longer
sentence than the hardened criminal who was experienced and took advantage of bar-
gaining opportunities. Chances of rehabilitation in the latter case are greatly reduced.
See Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain in Justice, 46
J. CAum. L.C. & P.S. 780, 790 (1956).
68 This effect is based on the fact that all bargaining will be conducted before the
public. It would be too idealistic to assume members of the public would regularly
attend the sessions to hear the "deals." Notwithstanding the few who might be present,
the pressure will still be on the prosecutor to have sufficient facts; first, because of the
immediate possibility that the judge might not accept the plea and second, because the
bargains will be a matter of public record, subject at any time to review by the press
or some organization. If a general practice were being made of large concessions with
weak evidence, the public could easily be made aware of this fact, bringing the antici-
pated condemnation. See Hoffman, Plea Bargaining and the Role of the Judge, 53 F.R.D.
499, 501 (1972) (prosecutors will be more accountable to general public).
69See Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1057 (1955). 'The discre-
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inequity which is prevalent today. Since the burden is now upon the de-
fendant to initiate plea discussions, only those with experienced counsel or
who "know the ropes" themselves are aware of the opportunity for a com-
promise plea. With the suggested change no longer would anyone fail to.
take advantage of a plea agreement simply because he was ignorant of the
procedure to be followed.
Plea bargaining is criticized because concessions are made by a prosecu-
tor just to secure a guilty plea. To forestall such an argument while at the
same time increase the overall validity of any settlement reached, both.
parties must bargain from a well-informed positionO In order to achieve
this, three things must be accomplished prior to any negotiations: 1) the
prosecutor must have before him the presentence report; 2) the defendant
should be afforded the opportunity to test the admissibility of any confes-
sions or seized evidence in the prosecutor's possession; and 3) the rules of
discovery should be liberalized.
An avowed purpose of a compromised plea is to allow for individualized
punishment with an eye toward rehabilitation rather than retribution.71 It
is essential for the prosecutor to have the presentence report in order to,
tailor the sentence, and it is impossible for him to structure some rehabilita-
tive program with only information of the present crime. It would be ad-
visable for the prosecutor to consult a probation officer for a suggested
framework within which to work.72
Of primary importance to the defendant's decision of how to plead is the
admissibility of confessions and seized evidence. Until he knows whether
such evidence will be excluded, he will not know the true strength of the
tionary power exercised by the prosecuting attorney in initiation, accusation, and dis-
continuance of prosecution gives him more control over an individual's liberty and
reputation than any other public official." Id.
Prosecutors are presently hesitant to initiate bargaining proceedings because of its
questionable validity and the fear that the public looks on the practice as an evil.
See ABA STANDARDS at 61-62. This hindrance would be removed with the open
recognition of plea bargaining.
70 1t is not to be thought that upon acceptance of the following suggestions, bargains
will not be offered solely for administrative reasons. With such requirements met, how-
ever, it would be a great deal easier to determine if this were the case, thus imposing on
the court the duty to rejct such pleas. Also the main reason the criticism is made now
is that prosecutors bargain with little or no information.
71 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949): "Retribution is no longer
the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders
have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence."
7It has been held that probation officers should not become a party to plea nego-
tiations, but the mere fact that he is consulted by both the prosecutor and defense
counsel as to the defendant's parole status will not make him a party. See Farrar v.
State, 52 Wis. 2d 651, 191 N.W.2d 214 (1971).
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prosecutor's case. However, a mandatoy pre-negotiation challenge could
work more to the detriment of the defendant and is therefore not suggested.
If the court were to decide that the evidence was admissible, the defend-
ant's chances of obtaining a bargain would be drastically reduced. Know-
ing this, if an accused still wished to test the admissibility of the evidence,
there should be some method available to him for this purpose.73
Discovery in criminal cases, though much contested in the past, is now
being accepted in varying degrees.74 With respect to plea bargaining, it
would appear logical that discovery should be mandatory to enable both
sides to comprehend adequately the relative merits of the case. This would
put a defendant with a tenuous defense to a difficult choice, however. Mak-
ing discovery optional at the election of the accused may be rationalized
from the point of view of lessening the pressures on the defendant to plead
guilty. If there is a possible defense unknown to the prosecutor, he will be
less disposed to a compromise, since his case will seem stronger. Also if
there is additional evidence that is unknown to the defendant, he will feel
less compelled to plead guilty since the prosecutor's case will seem weaker.
Although mandatory discovery is not desirable, it should be optional for
those defendants who wish to know exactly the case against them.75
B. The Bargaining Session
There are certain safeguards with respect to the actual bargaining session
which ideally should be observed in addition to making it public: 1) the
73 See FED. R. Crum. P. 41(e). One trial court on its own has agreed with defense
counsel to set aside the guilty plea if an adverse ruling on a motion to suppress was
later reversed. The appellate court recognized that a ruling in a motion to suppress
normally doesn't survive a guilty plea, but heard the appeal since the procedure 'fol-
lowed was suggested by the trial court. United States v. Frye, 271 A.2d 788 (D.C. Mun.
App. 1970).
74 Many jurisdictions now allow discovery of evidence in the possession of the prose-
cutor by the defendant preparing for trial. See, e.g., FED. R. Clam. P. 16; VA. SuP. CT.
R. 3A:14.
No jurisdiction exTressly allows for discovery before entry of a plea. Fmn. R. CRI . P.
16(f) provides the time for discovery to be "only within 10 days after arraign-
ment," which is subject to the possible construction that discovery is limited to the
post-arraignment period. The problem is not quite as prevalent with the new rules in
Virginia. VA. Sup. Cr. R. 3A:14(d) provides for discovery "at least 7 days before
the day fixed for trial." This could mean only the time prior to the seven day limit,
but it could also mean that the date of the trial must have been set. Such constructions
are mere speculation but would present potential problems. The rules should be
changed to expressly allow for pre-negotiation discovery.
75 If the defendant elects to take advantage of discovery procedures, the prosecutor
must be given reciprocal privileges. See generally Comment, Preplea Discovery: Guilty
Pleas and the Likelihood of Conviction at Trial, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 527 (1971).
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presence of both the defendant and his counsel is essential;7 2) the prosecu-
tor should be limited in the concessions he might offer; and 3) a record
should be made of the proceeding to aid the judge at arraignment in de-
ciding whether to accept or reject the plea.77
At present it is not unusual for defense counsel to confer with the pros-
ecutor out of the presence of the accused and later merely to relate to the
defendant the final offer, with an opinion as to the advisability of accepting
it. This procedure does not afford the defendant the opportunity to weigh
the situation, and most often puts him in the position of accepting the ad-
vice of his attorney on blind faith which may or may not be well founded.
If the defendant is present he might not be any more cognizant of all the
technical ramifications of everything said; but at least he would know what
evidence there is against him, and more importantly he could see his counsel
in the adversary role on his behalf. The defendant would then know that
the outcome is not merely the product of collusion without regard to his
interests. The defendant's final decision would still largely depend upon the
advice he received, but his acceptance of the outcome would likely be more
palatable.
There has been some question raised as to whether a defendant should
ever be permitted to waive counsel at the plea bargaining stage.78 Under
the present practice, an attorney is absolutely necessary to minimize the
hostile and unfamiliar atmosphere of the plea bargaining session.79 Much of
this problem would be alleviated by making the negotiations public. Under
the suggested system an attorney would still be necessary both to reduce
the impact of the unfamiliar proceedings and to give the defendant advice
concerning the admissibility of the prosecutor's evidence and the overall
76 But see Woody v. State, 445 S.W.2d 288 (Mo. 1969) (not unconstitutional for
state to bargain with defendant before counsel appointed, as long as defendant has
opportunity to discuss the plea with counsel before it is tendered).
77 See notes 91-93 infra and accompanying text.
78 See, e.g., Zales v. Henderson, 433 F.2d 20, 23 n.7 (5th Cit. 1970) (defendant who
waives counsel stands in no better position than one who enters guilty plea on the
advice of counsel); People v. Zunno, 384 Mich. 151, 180 N.W.2d 17 (1970); Semmes
v. Wifliard, 247 Ore. 583, 431 P.2d 844 (1967); Creighbaum v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 17,
150 N.W.2d 494 (1967). But see Shupe v. Sigler, 230 F. Supp. 601 (D. Neb. 1964);
Anderson v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930 (W.D.N.C. 1963).
79 It has been suggested that unlike the interrogation situation, the presence of counsel
cannot remove the coercive pressures on the defendant since the pressure is generated
by the choice itself. See 84 HARV. L. Rxv. 32, 155 (1970).
The presence of counsel might even be a detriment since courts are reluctant to
characterize a plea as involuntary if counsel was present. See Note, The Unconstitution-
ality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1387, 1391 (1970). But see Zales v. Henderson,
433 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1970) (defendant who waives counsel stands in no better position
than one who enters plea of guilty upon advice of counsel).
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probability of conviction at a jury trial.80 However, if a man could not
waive counsel, problems would arise in the situation of a man who could
readily afford a lawyer but refused to retain one. Society lacks both the
financial resources and the required attorneys to supply free counsel in all
such cases. The concept that an individual may waive his constitutional
rights is well established and the defendant should be allowed to forgo
counsel in this case. If a defendant offers a plea without having the advice
of an attorney, the court should extensively examine him to ensure that it
was made voluntarily and with full knowledge not only of the consequences
of the plea but also of the importance of this right.
Since this suggested procedure is structured primarily to minimize the
pressures inherent in the option to plead guilty, the pressures which may be
brought to bear upon the defendant by the prosecutor should be restricted.
One factor which is effectively utilized by the prosecutor is actually beyond
his control-that is "legislative bargaining." Though legislatures may no
longer apply one type of pressure,"' the existence of statutes demanding high
minimum sentences gives the prosecutor greater leverage with respect to
inducing pleas to lesser included offenses.8 2 An accused will be more likely
to accept the assurance of a lower sentence by pleading guilty if he knows
that the only way to avoid a much harsher one at trial is by an acquittal.
Legislatures should remove or at least reduce minimum sentences as they
serve no useful function in light of modern sentencing theories.
Those pressures over which the prosecutor does have control should be
limited also. 83 Plea negotiations should be in the form of offer and accept-
ance, not threats and submission.84 Some of the concessions which the pros-
80Plea bargaining places heavy responsibilities on the defense counsel. He must
protect the rights of the defendant while at the same time preserve the integrity of the
judicial system, and most importantly he must see that an innocent man does not plead
guilty. See United States v. Rogers, 289 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1968).
81 In the past, legislatures had structured punishment schemes in such a way that a
defendant could only be subjected to a more severe sentence if he chose a jury trial.
See, e.g., Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1970) (death penalty can only
be imposed by a jury). The Supreme Court invalidated such a plan since it "chilled"
the defendant's right to trial and the same result could be reached in some less drastic
manner. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
82 See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (Brennan, J, dissenting and
concurring). It is recognized that the pressures exerted by a legislative scheme have
more of an impact on a defendant than normal plea negotiations. In plea bargaining
there is a give and take proposition, but by statute the harsh terms are inflexibly stated.
83 See Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968)
(negotiations should be limited to quantum of punishment for an admittedly guilty
man).
84 Plea bargaining should not be employed as a coercive tool to force guilty pleas but
must be used in an attempt to reach an agreement which is acceptable by both sides
as being beneficial. See Dube v. State, - Ind. - , 275 N.E.2d 7 (1971).
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ecutor may now make assume the overtones of threats rather than mutually
beneficial offers.85 Any promise not to prosecute the accused's family is of
a threatening nature but the courts permit it to be used.88 Other alterna-
tives by their very nature make it extremely difficult for the defendant to
make a rational choice. The pressures certainly inherent in the choice be-
tween life and death, and possibly between a misdemeanor and felony, are
of such great weight that a defendant should not be forced to make a de-
cision when faced with them. 87 It is not unrealistic to demand a trial of
every capital case, and although it is more stringent than present require-
ments, "breathing space" would be given to the rights of the accused.
C. Considerations in Accepting the Plea
In addition to these suggested pre-arraignment changes, the duties of the
judge at arraignment must also be clarified. It is clearly the responsibility
of the judge to make inquiries of the defendant to ensure that his plea is
made voluntarily and with knowledge of its consequences. 88 To make an
accurate determination the judge must know of the existence of any bargain
made and the events of the negotiation proceedings. 89 Only if the court it-
self knows of the actual agreement which was made can it prevent any mis-
understanding by the accused, 90 and knowledge of the comments made by
the prosecutor as well as any concessions is essential to a finding of volun-
tariness.
Presently in most jurisdictions the promises made to a defendant are sel-
dom brought to the court's attention prior to the acceptance of the plea,
85See Ford v. United States, 418 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1969) (in order for a threat to
be illegal it must concern some illegitimate action); Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d
795 (lst Cir. 1959).
86See, e.g., Johnson v. Wilson, 371 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1967); Kent v. United States,
272 F.2d 795 (1st Cir. 1959); McGuffey v. Turner, 267 F. Supp. 136 (D. Utah 1967);
Lawler v. Page, 449 P.2d 714 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969).
87See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Williamson v. State, 441
F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1971); Richardson v. State - Mo. - , 470 S.W.2d 479 (1971).
8 8 See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (judge must "canvass" the de-
fendant to determine if plea is voluntary and knowledgeable).
89 See Jones v. United States, 423 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1970) (knowledge of agreement,
its terms and negotiations is crucial to effective discharge of court's responsibility).
90 From the cases there seems to be a recurring problem of the defendant claiming
that he did not receive the treatment he expected or understood he would receive. Due to
a lack of evidence most of these claims go unsubstantiated, but the appeals do point up
the fact that many defendants do not have a thorough understanding of exactly what
has been promised. See, e.g., United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1970)
(defendant alleged that prosecutor failed to fulfill promise to recommend sentence);
People v. Fisher, 24 Mich. App. 312, 180 N.W.2d 211 (1970) (defendant claimed she
was led to believe she would be placed on probation).
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even though the judge specifically asks if any have been made.91 It has been
suggested that a full disclosure on record at arraignment would cure this
deficiency, 92 but such a remedy would fail to give the judge truly accurate
information. Since he still would have to depend on the statements of those
who do not wish to lose the benefits gained, the judge would continue to
receive information sufficiently distorted to ensure the court's acceptance
of the tendered guilty plea. This problem would be circumvented by re-
quiring a record of the bargaining session itself. The record of the arraign-
ment proceeding is certainly important, but its function should be recog-
nized as a prophylactic measure against frivolous appeals and not as a source
to establish the validity of the plea.93
While he must be the arbiter of the validity of the plea and either accept
or reject it, there is substantial controversy as to whether the judge him-
self may actually participate in the bargaining. The authorities are incon-
sistent as to whether he may assume the role of a negotiator. Some cases hold
that any such participation by the judge renders the consequent plea in-
voluntary per se.9 4 The majority of the courts seem to feel that judicial in-
tervention is only one of the factors to be considered. 5 The sounder view
is that judicial bargaining should be prohibited. In light of the many op-
posing arguments,9 6 to allow it would be to permit an additional unneces-
siry pressure on the defendant. The judge should become involved only
after a tentative agreement has been reached and then only to the extent of
acceptance or rejection of the plea.97
91 See note 44 supra.
92 See ABA STANDARDS § 1.7. See also Proposed Amendments to FED. R. CRIM. P.,-52
F.R.D. 409, 415-16 (1971). The amendment to Rule 11 would require that notice be
given to the court of any agreement reached and that the record of the arraignment
proceeding include the terms of the bargain.
9 3 See United States ex rel. Wiggins v. Commonwealth, 430 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1970).
94See United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Mesmer v. Raines; 351 P.2d 1018 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960) (dictum) (court may not
bargain with defendant to induce pleas); Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d
689 (1969) (any participation by the judge is forbidden). -
I 5 See, e.g., Brown v. Peyton, 435 P.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1970) (judicial bargain not per
se bad but is one factor to consider); United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir.
1963) (plea valid even though judge suggested it and promised a specific sentence).
But even in these jurisdictions, the judge may render a plea involuntary by his threats.
See Tyler v. Swenson, 427 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1970)' (threat by judge of more severe
punishment if defendant found guilty establishes prima facie case of involuntariness of
guilty plea).
96 See United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (SD.N.Y. 1966). See
generally Note, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144,
173-77 (1968); 19 STAN. L. Rv. 1082 (1967); 5 GA. L. Rv. 809 (1971). In support of
judicial plea bargaining see Underwood, Let's Put Plea Discussions-and Agreements-
on Record, 1 LoYoLA (Cm) L.J. 1 (1970).
97 See ABA STANDARDS § 3.3 (a) and commentary at 72-74.
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Aside from voluntariness and understanding, the judge must consider other
factors before accepting a plea. The presentence report and a detailed state-
ment of the government's evidence must be consulted9" to determine the
appropriateness of the disposition with respect to the interests of both the
defendant and the government. A plea should be rejected if the punish-
ment suggested fails either to protect society or to rehabilitate the defendant.
An understanding of the evidence both for and against the defendant
should be a determinative factor in the judge's decision, and a plea should
be rejected if there is no factual basis to substantiate it. 9 If the facts are
not clear or are insufficient, the judge should ask the prosecutor to particu-
larize or should question the defendant to determine his involvement in the
charge alleged. As to the quantum of the facts necessary to sustain a guilty
plea, there is some controversy over the required amount.100 It is suggested
that enough facts should be presented which would enable the judge to find
that reasonable men could convict the defendant on these facts.' Such a
burden of proof would cause a more thorough investigation by the prose-
cutor and would tend to limit arbitrary prosecutions.
The judge should examine the record for possible defenses which have
98But see People v. Patton, 25 Mich. App. 713, 181 N.W.2d 569 (1970) (not error
for court to accept guilty plea without having preliminary examination transcript in
the court file).
99 See FED. R. CRiM. P. 11 (as amended Feb. 28, 1966). The amendment in 1966
added the requirement that the judge must find a factual basis for the plea, but fails to
say how substantial these facts must be.
100 See People v. Johnson, 33 App. Div. 2d 573, 305 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1969) (if court
upon questioning the defendant receives facts inconsistent with crime, it should proceed
with extreme caution). But see People v. Wade, 24 Mich. App. 518, 180 N.W.2d 349
(1970) (if defendant's response gives reason to doubt plea, court should reject it). See
generally notes 102-05 infra.
United States v. Silva, 449 F.2d 145 (ist Cir. 1971) (strong evidence of guilt); United
States v. Youpee, 419 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1969) (must be some basis in fact); Griffin
v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (high probability of conviction). Cf.
United States ex rel. Miner v. Erickson, 428 F.2d 623 (8th Cir. 1970) (caution in ac-
cepting plea varies with gravity of the offense).
101 The requirement is not and should not be that the facts offered must establish
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Bartlett, 17 Mich. App. 205, 169 N.W.2d
337 (1969). The rule should be that substantial, uncontroversial facts be presented on
which the court could say that the defendant might well be convicted if there was a
trial. See People v. Peiffer, 34 Mich. App. 123, 190 N.W.2d 699 (1971).
The old Virginia rule concerning the effect of a guilty plea is a good example of
what should be done. If a plea of guilty was tendered, the court would hear and de-
termine the case without a jury. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-192 (1960). Unfortunately
this section has been superseded by the new rules of criminal procedure which do not
require any factual determination by the court prior to the acceptance of the guilty plea.
VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:11.
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not been raised. There is some controversy as to whether a judge may re-
ject a plea because of an unasserted defense, 102 but the better view would
seem to dictate the rejection of the plea unless the defendant can give some
adequate justification for his decision.103
Finally, if at arraignment the defendant pleads guilty but nevertheless
maintains his innocence, the judge should reject the plea. The majority of
courts today equate such an equivocal plea to a plea of nolo contendere and
have no difficulty in accepting it.104 Since a guilty plea is a conviction
no less conclusive than a verdict of a jury, due process should require from
the accused an unequivocal admission of his guilt to justify the acceptance
of his plea.10
If for whatever reason the judge cannot accept the terms of the agree-
ment as decided upon by the parties, he should reject the plea or at least
inform the defendant of his decision and of his unqualified right to with-
draw the guilty plea.'06 Upon withdrawal of the plea, the statements made
by the accused during the proceedings or the fact of the initial guilty plea
should be inadmissible in any subsequent trial for all purposes.107 To guar-
antee the defendant his right to an impartial judge, the judge at a trial sub-
sequent to a guilty plea withdrawal should not be the same one who re-
jected the plea.
102The majority rule seems to prevent the judge from rejecting the plea. See, e.g,
Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
103 For example, there may be the possible defense of insanity but the defendant pre-
fers not to assert it because he calculates that he would spend more time in the mental
institution than he would in prison.
The law today is that acceptance of a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of
the court. Hopefully courts could be persuaded that to reject a plea because of possible
defenses is within their discretion. See Tremblay v. Overholser, 199 F. Supp. 569
(D.D.C. 1961).
104 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); United States v. Silva,
449 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1971) (assertion of innocence irrelevant as long as there is
strong evidence against the defendant); Oaks v. Wainwright, 445 F.2d 1062 (5th Cir.
1971); People v. Cook, 1 1. App. 3d 292, 274 N.E.2d 209 (1971) (equivocal plea valid
if defendant intelligently decides his interests require such a plea).
105 Rejection of an equivocal plea has been held to be validly within the court's dis-
cretion. See United States v. Bednarski, 445 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1971). See also People
v. Johnson, 8 Mich. App. 204, 154 N.W.2d 16 (1967) (court should refuse the plea if
defendant's answers are limited or qualified); State v. Forcella, 52 NJ. 263, 245 A.2d
181 (1968) (equivocal plea cannot be accepted); People v. Valiente, 28 App. Div. 2d 983,
283 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1967) (inability to answer to question of guilt invalidates plea);
State v. Stacy, 43 Wash. 2d 358, 261 P.2d 400 (1953) (court should refuse to accept
until any equivocation is eliminated). See generally 75 DicK. L. REv. 366 (1971).
106 See ABA STANDARDS § 2.1 (a) (ii).
107 Id. §§ 2.2, 3.4.
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III. CONCLUSION
Plea bargaining as it is practiced today satisfies neither the accused nor
the public. The defendant feels coerced to relinquish his constitutional pro-
tections and is disillusioned by unequal treatment. The public distrusts all
compromise in light of their potential political motivations, being unable to
determine why or how they were brought about. It has been demonstrated
that plea bargaining is necessary, but its continuation should be predicated
upon substantial reformation. Once the abuses and inequities have been
eliminated, the practice will become an effective tool not only in the dis-
position of cases but also in the achievement of justice.
F. P. W.
